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Executive summary
China’s recent emergence as a leading global economic and financial powerhouse has 
implications for all aspects of global governance. While a growing body of literature has 
analysed the consequences for international trade arrangements, the International Mone-
tary Fund (IMF) and Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs), fewer studies have focused 
on the cluster of institutions that oversee financial regulatory standard-setting and policy 
development at the global level, referred to here as the global financial regulatory system. 
In spite of significant crisis-induced changes in the last decade, this system has not suffi-
ciently adapted to the new reality of China’s prominence, and has remained unsustainably 
centred on incumbent North Atlantic financial systems1. This lagging pattern is in the inter-
est neither of the incumbents, nor of China, nor of the world as a whole. 
In order to move towards a better institutional balance, global financial regulatory bodies 
should increase the presence and prominence of Chinese participants in their governance 
and operations. China should correspondingly offer greater engagement, and promote 
institutional improvements to address some of the challenges that the global system in its 
current form has been unable to tackle. 
1  ‘North Atlantic’ is used here as shorthand for Europe and North America. 
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The global financial regulatory system: 
taking stock
International financial institutions were an innovation of the second quarter of the twentieth 
century. In particular, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) was created in 1930 and 
the IMF was created in 1945. But international arrangements on financial regulatory matters 
remained minimal until the early 1970s. At that time, and in the context of incipient inter-
nationalisation of financial markets and financial turmoil in advanced economies, several 
new international bodies were created: notably the Euro-currency Standing Committee of 
the BIS (1971), now the Committee on the Global Financial System (CGFS); the International 
Accounting Standards Committee (1973), now the International Financial Reporting Stand-
ards Foundation (IFRS Foundation); the Inter-American Regional Association of securities 
regulatory authorities (1974), expanded in 1983 to become the International Organisation of 
Securities Commissions (IOSCO); the Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory 
Practices at the BIS (1974), now the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS); and the 
Group of Six (1975), now the G7. More specialised bodies were created in the 1980s and 1990s, 
particularly in the wake of the 1997-98 Asian Financial Crisis. That crisis led to the emergence 
of the G20, which at that time (1999) was a group of finance ministers and central bank gover-
nors, and of the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), also in 1999. 
Further change and strengthening came in the immediate aftermath of the financial 
panic of September-October 2008. In November 2008, the G20 held its first summit meeting 
of heads of state and government, in Washington DC, with an agenda that was dominated by 
financial regulatory issues (Rottier and Véron, 2010). The FSF was subsequently enlarged to 
include most major emerging economies and non-Western international financial cen-
tres, and was renamed the Financial Stability Board (FSB) in April 2009 at the G20’s second 
summit meeting in London. At the subsequent G20 summit, in Pittsburgh in September 2009, 
the US Treasury Secretary described the FSB and its constituent international financial bodies 
as a “fourth pillar” of the global economic architecture, complementing the IMF, the World 
Bank and the World Trade Organisation (WTO)2. The Washington, London and Pittsburgh 
meetings defined an ambitious and, at the global level, unprecedented agenda that has come 
to be referred to officially as “G20 financial regulatory reforms” (FSB, 2015b). 
In this context, the global financial regulatory system can be defined as being formed by 
the FSB and its members that have a global (as opposed to national, or in the case of Euro-
pean institutions, regional) remit. In addition to the already mentioned BCBS, BIS, CGFS, 
IFRS Foundation3, IMF, IOSCO and World Bank, the system thus defined also includes the 
BIS’s Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures (CPMI), the International Associ-
ation of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD). Additional relevant bodies, which are not formally members of the 
FSB but participate in the global system, include the Financial Action Task Force on Money 
Laundering (FATF), Global Legal Entity Identifier Foundation (GLEIF), the International 
Association of Deposit Insurers (IADI) and the International Forum of Independent Audit 
2  “[T]he important thing we did in London (…) is to add, in effect, a fourth pillar to the architecture of cooperation we 
established after the second world war. After the second world war, we came together and established the IMF, the World 
Bank, the GATT which became the WTO. But the Financial Stability Board is, in effect, a fourth pillar of that architecture. 
And that forum, just for those of you who are not familiar with it, again brings together central banks, finance ministers, 
supervisors of banks, market regulators like the SEC and the CFTC, the accounting standard setters – brings them together 
and tries to forge consensus on standards, so we can have, again, common standards applied globally.” Press briefing by 
US Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner on the G20 Meetings, White House, 24 September 2009. 
3  Formally the membership of the FSB is held by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), which is 
hosted by the IFRS Foundation. 
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Regulators (IFIAR)4. As Table 1 illustrates, these bodies vary widely in terms of membership 
and mandate. 
Table 1: The global financial regulatory system
Source: Bruegel based on institutions’ websites, consulted May 2016. See main text for the explanation of acronyms. Notes: a Jurisdic-
tions include sub-sovereign entities (eg Guernsey, Hong Kong SAR, or US states and territories) and regional groupings (such as the 
European Union). b There is one member per jurisdiction at the BIS, IMF, World Bank and OECD. In other bodies, some jurisdictions have 
several members, such as the US Federal Reserve Board and Federal Reserve Bank of New York in the CGFS and CPMI. Global institutions 
such as the IMF and World Bank are members of bodies such as the FSB and IAIS, but are not counted as separate jurisdictions. c  The IFRS 
Foundation is incorporated in the United States (Delaware), but its operations are almost entirely in London. d The IFRS Foundation and 
GLEIF are not organised across jurisdictional lines. e Only ordinary members. f The establishment of a permanent secretariat in Tokyo was 
announced by IFIAR in late April 2016, and is expected in 2017. NB The People’s Republic of China is a member of all jurisdiction-based 
bodies except IADI and IFIAR.
 Eight years on from the Washington Summit, the G20 financial regulatory reforms can be 
judged as having mixed results. Assessing the success of financial reforms is always somewhat 
judgmental to start with, as there is no objective way (yet?) to measure financial stability. Fur-
thermore, many of the reforms entail long transition periods and have thus not yet been fully 
implemented. There have been a number of successes (see also GAO, 2014; Véron, 2014). In 
particular, the BCBS’s Basel III accord of 2010, with new rules for capital, leverage and liquid-
ity, and complementary reforms such as requirements for additional loss-absorbing capacity 
at large financial institutions designated by the FSB as Global Systemically Important Banks 
(G-SIBs; see FSB, 2015a), have significantly strengthened the prudential framework for large 
4  Other potentially relevant organisations, such as the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board 
(IAASB) and the International Public Sector Accounting Standards Board (IPSASB), both hosted by the International 
Federation of Accountants, are not included in the list because their standards have not yet been adopted by a critical 
mass of jurisdictions. Coordinating committees and other groups that don’t have a permanent secretariat, including 
the G20 itself, are also not included. 
Body Creation HQ/Secretariat Summarised mandate Jurisdictions a Members b
BIS 1930 Basel (CH) Central bank cooperation 60 60
IMF 1945 Washington (US) Financial stability of 
countries
189 189
World Bank 1945 Washington (US) Development 189 189
OECD 1948 Paris (FR) Economic sustainability 34 34
CGFS 1971 Basel (CH) Monitoring market 
developments
22 23
IFRS Found. 1973 London (UK) c Financial accounting 
standards
not relevant d not relevant d
BCBS 1974 Basel (CH) Banking supervisory 
standards
28 45
IOSCO 1974/83 Madrid (ES) Securities markets regulation 123 e 126 e
CPMI 1980 Basel (CH) Financial infrastructure 
standards
24 25
FATF 1989 Paris (FR) Combating the financing of 
crime and terrorism
37 37
IAIS 1994 Basel (CH) Insurance supervisory 
standards
195 210
FSB 1999 Basel (CH) Financial regulation 25 68
IADI 2002 Basel (CH) Deposit insurance standards 79 80
IFIAR 2006 Tokyo (JP) f Audit oversight 51 55
GLEIF 2014 Basel (CH) Legal entity identifiers not relevant d not relevant d
4 Policy Contribution | Issue n˚19 | 2016
internationally active banks. The BCBS has also developed a pioneering framework to assess 
to what extent the laws and regulations adopted by individual jurisdictions are compliant 
with its standards, thus greatly enhancing its authoritativeness5. 
Other reforms have had questionable impact, or have failed entirely. One failed reform 
was the global convergence of financial accounting standards, initially heralded by the G20 
as an important objective but later quietly abandoned after several successive deadlines 
were missed6. The implementation of the G20’s ambitious reforms of over-the-counter (OTC) 
derivatives markets has been delayed in many jurisdictions, and it is therefore too early to 
assess its full impact. Specifically, the G20-fostered move towards more central clearing is 
leading to the concentration of systemic risk in derivatives central counterparties (CCPs) or 
clearing houses (eg Boissel et al, 2016), creating new forms of systemic risk which in turn call 
for policy responses still to come, and may also lead to initially unintended market fragmen-
tation across currency areas. Separately, the reporting of OTC derivatives transactions to trade 
repositories is still far from fully delivering on its promise to help supervisors assess develop-
ments of relevance for financial stability (DTCC, 2015). 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the success or lack thereof of G20 financial regulatory reforms 
is strongly correlated with the strength of the corresponding global institutional framework 
(Rottier and Véron, 2010). In particular, the long-established cooperation between the world’s 
main central banks through the BIS and its various committees has generally resulted in 
decent effectiveness of reforms within their remit, such as Basel III. By contrast, cooperation 
between securities regulators is of a more ad-hoc nature, and IOSCO has generally found 
it difficult to agree on strong common standards and ensure their general adoption, as is 
illustrated by the G20’s failure on financial accounting standards convergence7. One of the 
reasons why the design and implementation of OTC derivatives reforms have been so lop-
sided is because there is an awkward overlap of responsibilities in this area between central 
banks with a financial stability mandate (represented in CPMI) and securities regulators with 
a market integrity mandate (represented in IOSCO). Some standards have been jointly issued 
by CPMI and IOSCO (eg Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures, first published in 
April 2012), but they have often been less specific and/or effective than global standards in 
other financial regulatory areas. 
5  See successive Regulatory Consistency Assessment Programme reports published by the BCBS. Under this 
programme, the People’s Republic of China was assessed in 2013 as ‘compliant,’ while in 2014 the United States was 
‘largely compliant’ and the European Union ‘materially non-compliant.’ 
6  The People’s Republic of China still maintains its own set of accounting standards, and (unlike eg Japan) does not 
allow the use of IFRS by listed companies as an alternative to its national standards. Local accounting standards in 
Hong Kong SAR, though not in Macao SAR, are identical to IFRS. The United States allows IFRS as an alternative to its 
national standards for foreign issuers, but not for domestic ones. The European Union has endorsed all IFRS standards 
as domestic law, with the only exception of a limited ‘carve-out’ in the standard for financial instruments. Overall, 
a majority of the world’s sovereign jurisdictions, representing close to half of global GDP, have mandated IFRS for 
publicly listed companies. Most of the corresponding policy decisions were made in the decade before the first G20 
summit (Pacter, 2015, and own calculations). 
7  Choices of mandatory accounting standards are typically, though not universally, within the scope of responsibility 
of securities market regulators. 
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The global financial regulatory system 
retains North Atlantic characteristics
The panic of September-October 2008 led to a welcome shift of venue from the G7 to the G20 
for the global coordination of economic and financial policy. This shift was echoed in early 
2009 by the enlargement to major emerging economies and non-Western financial centres of 
the membership of the FSB (succeeding the FSF) and of several key BIS committees including 
the BCBS, CGFS and CPMI. 
Nevertheless, the membership and governance of many of the bodies that form the global 
financial regulatory system remains deeply unbalanced. There is abundant analysis of this 
issue with respect to the IMF (eg Truman, 2015). Similar and sometimes even greater distor-
tions exist in other bodies. For example, even after the 2009 enlargement, European Union 
(EU) member states, plus the EU itself, represent no fewer than 10 of the 28 jurisdictions 
represented in the BCBS. Of these, seven are euro-area countries whose representation in the 
Committee no longer appears justified, since the European Central Bank (ECB) has been in 
charge of setting supervisory policy for the entire euro area since November 2014, as part of 
the broader EU reform known as banking union8. 
Similarly, Europeans are overrepresented in the FSB’s Steering Committee (FSB, 2015d), 
both among the member jurisdictions (especially those with more than one representative, 
and with similarly questionable inclusion of euro-area national central banks as noted above 
about the BCBS9) and among the global bodies, whose 10 representatives include 8 Europe-
ans, one American, one Australian, and no Asian at all.10 
The system’s North Atlantic bias is even more pronounced, indeed overwhelming, 
when looking at the bodies’ leaderships, as opposed to memberships. Table 2 illustrates 
this by listing all top positions in the bodies mentioned in Table 1, including the chairs of 
decision-making bodies (such as an executive board) and heads of permanent staff, where 
separate. The right-hand column does not require much comment. 
Moreover, another distortion inherited from history is that, as Table 1 indicates, 
all these bodies are also headquartered and mainly based in the North Atlantic region 
(Basel, Paris, Madrid, London and Washington DC), with the only exception being IFIAR’s 
still-to-be-established secretariat in Tokyo11. 
Thus, the global financial regulatory system retains a North Atlantic bias in its governance 
and operations that has only been very partly eroded by initiatives since 2007. A separate 
question, however, is whether this bias results in regulatory outcomes and decisions that are 
tilted in favour of North Atlantic interests. On this, the evidence is far from clear. While the 
G20 has regularly paid lip-service to the notion that regulatory outcomes need to be better 
tailored to the specificities of developing and emerging economies, this aspiration has mostly 
been rhetorical rather than practical. There is no clear case, for example, that Basel III is 
less beneficial to emerging economies than it is to the European Union or the United States. 
Moreover, there are also cases of successful advocacy by non-Western jurisdictions of special 
interests in global financial regulatory processes: examples include the exception made by the 
IASB for long-held shares from fair-value measurement in the IFRS 9 standard on financial 
instruments accounting, which was a Japanese request, and the exception made for large 
8  The ECB and its banking supervisory arm became full members of the BCBS shortly before this transition, in 
October 2014. 
9  National central banks in the euro area retain policy autonomy in several areas including macro-prudential poli-
cies, but no longer in either monetary policy or banking supervision. 
10  In this calculation, Mark Carney is labelled as from the EU in his capacity as Governor of the Bank of England, 
even though he is a Canadian National. 
11  Several of the bodies have regional offices that complement their North Atlantic headquarters. For example, the 
BIS has an office in Hong Kong (and another one in Mexico City); the IMF and World Bank have offices in numerous 
locations worldwide; the IFRS Foundation has a small office in Tokyo. 
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banks from emerging economies in the FSB’s term sheet for Total Loss-Absorbing Capacity 
(TLAC), a request made in particular by China (FSB, 2015c). 
Table 2: Leadership positions in the global financial regulatory system
Source: Bruegel based on institutions’ websites, consulted July 2016. See main text for the explanation of acronyms.  Notes: 
a GHOS: Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision. b Mr Adler heads the Hong Kong Securities & Finance Commission, 
but is a British citizen. c The head of IFIAR’s future permanent secretariat has not at the time of writing been appointed. 
Even so, the extent of the system’s North Atlantic bias, more than seven years after the shift 
from G7 to G20, remains remarkable. There is no question that the willingness of incumbent 
participants, especially Europeans, to preserve a status quo that they perceive as beneficial to 
them is one of the reasons for this situation. But the lack of change is probably not attributable 
only to resistance from incumbents. Evidence is missing of any strong advocacy for rebalanc-
ing coming from the other stakeholders, especially large emerging economies, many of which 
– including often China – have acted as status-quo participants, in financial regulatory mat-
ters (Walter, 2010; He, 2015) and more generally on global governance reform (Swaine, 2016). 
Instead, the evidence rather points to China taking global financial regulatory standards ‘off the 
shelf’ for use as a lever for domestic financial reform (Kempthorne, 2015), similarly to what was 
often the case in the EU before the crisis, for example in its adoption of IFRS in the early 2000s 
(Véron, 2007). 
Body Position Holder Workload Nationality Region
BIS
Board Chairman Jens Weidmann Part time German North Atlantic
General Manager Jaime Caruana Full time Spanish North Atlantic
IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde Full time French North Atlantic
World Bank President Jim Yong Kim Full time American North Atlantic
OECD Secretary General Angel Gurria Full time Mexican North Atlantic
CGFS
Chair William Dudley Part time American North Atlantic
Head of Secretariat Kostas Tsatsaronis Full time Greek North Atlantic
IFRS Chair of Trustees Michel Prada Part time French North Atlantic
Foundation IASB Chair Hans Hoogervorst Full time Dutch North Atlantic
BCBS
Chair GHOS a Mario Draghi Part time Italian North Atlantic
Chair Stefan Ingves Part time Swedish North Atlantic
Secretary General William Coen Full time American North Atlantic
IOSCO
Board Chairman Ashley Ian Alder Part time British b North Atlantic
Secretary General Paul Andrews Full time American North Atlantic
CPMI
Chair Benoit Coeuré Part time French North Atlantic
Head of Secretariat Morten Bech Full time Danish North Atlantic
FATF
President J.M. Vega-Serrano Part time Spanish North Atlantic
Executive Secretary David Lewis Full time British North Atlantic
IAIS
Exec. Committee Chair Victoria Saporta Part time British North Atlantic
Secretary General Yoshihiro Kawai Full time Japanese Other
FSB
Chair Mark Carney Part time Canadian North Atlantic
Secretary General Svein Andresen Full time Norwegian North Atlantic
IADI
President Thomas Hoenig Part time American North Atlantic
Secretary General Gail Verley Full time American North Atlantic
IFIAR c Chair Janine van Diggelen Part time Dutch North Atlantic
GLEIF
Board Chairman Gerard Hartsink Part time Dutch North Atlantic
CEO Stephan Wolf Full time German North Atlantic
7 Policy Contribution | Issue n˚19 | 2016
The global financial regulatory system 
needs a Chinese dream
The state of affairs described in the previous section might be acceptable if the North Atlantic 
region was expected to dominate the global financial system for the foreseeable future. But 
this is no longer a valid assumption. The pace of financial development in China has been so 
rapid in the last few years that, on some indicators, the move of the global system’s centre of 
gravity towards China has already happened. For example, and as Table 3 illustrates, China is 
now the world’s largest single banking jurisdiction in terms of total assets, ahead of the euro 
area, a fact that few would have predicted only a decade ago. This is even more striking when 
keeping in mind that ‘shadow banking’ assets are mostly excluded from this calculation12. 
Table 3: Banking systems in comparative perspective, end-2015
Banking system
Total assets 
(US$ trillion)
Domestic 
assets 
(US$ trillion)
Foreign                                                  
assets                                               
(US$ trillion)
China 32.1 30.7 1.4
Euro area 31.6 25.9 5.7
United States 16.3 14.8 1.5
Source: Schoenmaker and Véron (2016). Calculations based on SNL data and ECB (2016b) for the euro area, China Banking Regulatory 
Commission (CBRC) for China, and Federal Reserve for the United States. Notes: total assets comprise consolidated assets of domestic 
banking groups and domestic assets of subsidiaries and branches of foreign banks. To calculate the size of the respective banking sys-
tem (labelled as domestic assets), the foreign assets of domestic banks are deducted. The concentration ratio of the largest five banks 
(CR-5) is based on their domestic assets as percentage of total domestic assets.
China’s increasing heft in the global financial system is not limited to banking. The 
aggregate market capitalisation of its listed companies has become too large to ignore, as 
has the size of its corporate bond markets. Furthermore, China’s financial development 
should not be seen only from a quantitative standpoint. While capital allocation remains 
largely policy-driven, there have been significant moves towards more market discipline in 
recent years, including liberalisation of bank deposit rates and the more recent willingness 
of the authorities to tolerate corporate defaults even of state-owned companies. One also 
assumes that lessons from the massive government intervention in China’s equity markets 
around mid-2015 will lead to a more restrained future stance in this area as well, allowing 
equity prices to be increasingly driven by the interplay of supply and demand. It is also 
unlikely that the recent dramatic rise in indicators such as China’s share of global banking 
assets or of global market capitalisation could be entirely reversed by future adverse market 
developments. Even in a scenario of systemic crisis, the evidence from past experience 
suggests that total banking assets would stop growing but would remain broadly at their 
current high level over an extended period of time13. 
Furthermore, China’s financial system will most likely become increasingly intercon-
nected with the rest of the global financial system. Size is a major driver of this: even if 
the Chinese banking system is less open to cross-border activity than the systems of other 
jurisdictions (as also illustrated by Table 3), its sheer magnitude implies global systemic 
12  Banking systems are defined here by the geographical scope of banking supervision. Under this definition, the 
euro area is now a single banking system, while different banking systems coexist in the European Union. 
13  Such a ‘plateauing’ pattern was observed, among other cases and with limited variations, in Japan after 1990 and 
in the euro area, the UK and the US after 2008. 
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significance. Furthermore, Chinese banks are increasingly active outside mainland China, 
together with non-financial companies driven both by individual firm strategies and by policy 
projects such as the Belt and Road Initiative. Meanwhile, Chinese authorities are gradually 
lifting restrictions on international investors’ access to its domestic equity and bond markets, 
including the Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect, started in 2014, and the forthcoming 
Shenzhen-Hong Kong Stock Connect. International financial integration is gradually linking 
China together with other countries like a financial ‘Grand Canal’ that interconnects different 
economies, fosters cross-border interdependencies and increases aggregate wealth, but can 
also be a channel for the propagation of shocks – very much as China’s own Grand Canal has 
linked its provinces together since ancient times14. 
China is also, and increasingly, at the frontier of some aspects of contemporary financial 
development, ahead of North Atlantic jurisdictions. This is particularly the case for inter-
net- and smartphone-enabled financial services business models (referred to in China as 
internet finance), several segments of which are more developed in China than in Europe 
or the United States. Internet finance, like cross-border financial integration, illustrates the 
reality that with financial development comes great wealth creation but also the possibility 
of increased financial disruption, including the risks of fraud, cybersecurity violations and 
uncontrolled herd behaviour in a market downturn. 
For all these reasons, the current fairly peripheral (or at best, discreet) role of China in the 
global financial regulatory system is increasingly problematic. The system needs a guiding 
vision in which China becomes much more central – a ‘Chinese dream.’ The system’s (largely 
North Atlantic) protagonists should not count only on China’s initiatives aimed at increasing its 
own salience in global financial-services policy discussions, but should rather be proactive in 
introducing reforms that give China a position and responsibility commensurate with its pres-
ent and predictable future importance. Not doing so will increasingly carry risks for all stake-
holders involved, such as being caught unprepared by a globally relevant materialisation of risks 
that involve Chinese financial system participants among others. A foot-dragging approach, 
encapsulated in the Chinese expression yu guo ji jie gui (与国际接轨, ‘catching up with the 
world’ – see He, 2015), will not be sufficient to address this challenge. Front-loading the rise of 
China in global finance in the global financial regulatory infrastructure is evidently a challeng-
ing political proposition, for different reasons in Europe (collectively the most overrepresented 
incumbent), in the United States (given domestic political dynamics at the time of writing) and 
perhaps even in China itself. But there is little doubt that it would ultimately be in the best inter-
est of the North Atlantic jurisdictions, as well as of China and of the rest of the world. 
Making the dream come true
The vision of a global financial regulatory system in which China holds a major position can 
of course not be realised in one single step. It may entail at least three clusters of initiatives, to 
be developed and implemented over an extended period. 
First, the relevant global bodies should reform themselves to increase the presence and 
prominence of Chinese participants in their operations, and specifically in their member-
ship, leadership and location. As for membership, national central banks from the euro 
area, which in the aftermath of banking union no longer have significant policymaking 
autonomy, should renounce their individual representation in the Basel Committee for 
Banking Supervision and in the Financial Stability Board, thus freeing space for a more bal-
14  The author is indebted to Professor He Liping of Beijing Normal University for the Grand Canal metaphor of 
cross-border financial integration. 
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anced discussion in a more compact format; conversely, the FSB should welcome the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) as an additional member organisation, perhaps 
together with the US Financial Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC); and China’s quota at 
the IMF should further increase beyond the implementation of the 2010 reform package15. 
As for leadership, relevant global financial regulatory bodies should promote qualified 
Chinese officials to succeed the current North Atlantic incumbents when their terms expire 
(see Table 2), and should actively nurture a growing cadre of Chinese professionals among 
their staff. As for location, further steps should be envisaged to rebalance the current land-
scape, including the relocation of the FSB’s permanent secretariat to a suitable jurisdiction 
in Asia, eg Hong Kong or Singapore (Véron, 2014). 
Second, greater Chinese engagement is also needed. While observers often refer to the 
age-old precept of tao guang yang hui (韬光养晦, ‘hide brilliance, favour obscurity’), China’s 
authorities actually need to be more assertive in their participation in international finan-
cial regulatory bodies. This should include presenting suitable candidates for leadership 
positions, for the global system’s common good. The adoption by China of relevant global 
standards, including IFRS, should be completed, if not in full then with a much more limited 
number of exceptions and variations than is currently the case. China should also reform its 
public auditing policy framework to enable its participation in IFIAR and to allow effective 
professional cooperation with other jurisdictions’ audit oversight authorities. More generally, 
progress is needed on a range of issues involving the sharing or exchange of financial data, 
both in terms of the willingness of China and its international partners to give each other data 
access, and in terms of their respective abilities to guarantee each other that data that needs 
to remain confidential will stay so. 
Greater Chinese engagement could help unlock reforms in key areas of the global finan-
cial regulatory agenda. For example, as mentioned above, the centralisation of derivatives 
clearing in CCPs is creating new types of systemic risks, but initiatives to oversee and manage 
these risks are hampered by special interests and turf considerations among North Atlantic 
financial authorities. Since China is exposed to these risks even as it does not have (yet) a 
significant derivatives market on its own, Chinese officials would be ideally placed to play a 
constructive ‘honest broker’ role to advance an effective reform agenda in this area (see also 
below). Similarly, China could push for steps towards international supervision of financial 
firms that are pure information intermediaries, such as credit rating agencies, trade reposi-
tories and audit firms. These do not carry a fiscal or quasi-fiscal risk in case of failure, unlike 
banks, and their public supervision can thus be entirely disconnected from matters of fiscal 
sovereignty16. Such a push would be in line with past suggestions by Chinese officials, eg the 
proposal made in 2010 by the head of China’s banking supervisor for dealing with systemi-
cally important international financial firms with “an international treaty which sets funda-
mental rules for information-sharing, equal treatment of stakeholders across jurisdictions and 
depositor protection” (Liu, 2010). Of course, China should simultaneously continue on its path 
of vigorous domestic financial reform to enhance market discipline in its financial system and 
more efficient capital allocation in its economy (Posen and Véron, 2015). 
Introducing the Chinese presidency of the G20 in late 2015, President Xi Jinping wrote that 
“China will work with all other parties to pull in one direction in the spirit of win-win partner-
ship. We should pool wisdom, form synergy (…) and jointly advance international economic 
cooperation” (Xi, 2015). Formulating and achieving a ‘Chinese dream’ for global financial 
regulation would be a prime application of these principles, involving the world’s major juris-
15  One recent constructive step in the same spirit was the long-delayed extension to China of membership of the 
IFRS Foundation’s Monitoring Board, achieved in 2016. The Monitoring Board is not formally part of the IFRS Founda-
tion, but oversees its activities including (by voluntary agreement) the appointment of the Foundation’s Trustees. 
16  Credit rating agencies and trade repositories, though not (yet) audit firms, are now supervised supranationally in 
the European Union (by the Paris-based European Securities and Markets Authority, established in 2011), in a frame-
work that, unlike banking union, covers all 28 EU member states including the United Kingdom. 
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dictions. As presented above, such an ambition would preserve the bulk of financial regula-
tion and supervision under national sovereignty, bound by the international rule of law. But 
it would also require vision, courage and perseverance to put the global financial regulatory 
system on a sustainable path – one in which China plays a major role. 
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